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I.

INTRODUCTION

The American Law Institute (ALI) commissioned its study of Enterprise Responsibilityfor PersonalInjury1 (the Study) in the mid1980s in the midst of widespread concern about spiralling insurance
premiums charged to people and businesses lucky enough to find any
tort liability coverage. When our Study finally appeared in the early
1990s, litigation and premium rates had plateaued and in some sectors were even dropping. If anything, however, debates about the tort
crisis had by that time become even more strident in tone. Thus,
after listening to intense exchanges between members of the plaintiff
and defense bars at its annual meeting in 1991, the American Law
Institute's Council decided to duck the fundamental policy questions
we had raised about reforming tort litigation and to confine further
Institute deliberations to restating tort doctrine.
No doubt, the ALI leadership felt confirmed in its judgment that
discretion was the better part of valor when, shortly thereafter, the
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1.

AMERICAN LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR

PERSONAL INJURY (1991) [hereinafter ALI STUDY]. This study was initially known as
Compensation and Liability for Product and Process Injuries.

tort system became a prominent topic on the national political
agenda. A crucial moment was Vice President Dan Quayle's controversial address in August 1991 to the American Bar Association. In
his address, the Vice President decried the "fact" that the United
States had seventy percent of the world's lawyers who were generating a $300 billion annual tort bill.2 Lawyers in tasselled loafers - as
President George Bush derisively labelled them - had become one
of the last groups whom it was still politically correct to insult during the 1992 election campaign.
With the new Clinton Administration in place (and with lawyers
more than well represented), we fondly hope that our Study will
contribute to a more reasoned debate about the role tort liability
should play in our law and lives. The Study's overview of the legal,
social, and economic issues, together with a full list of our recommendations for reform, are reproduced at the beginning of this Symposium issue of the San Diego Law Review. In this article we shall
offer some further reflections about specific areas and proposals in
the Study that have evoked important questions and comments.
II. Too MANY LAWYERS AND LAWSUITS?

As a prelude to any such discussion, getting the facts straight is
crucial. The United States does not have seventy percent of the
world's lawyers, nor does it spend $300 billion on the tort system.
The number of lawyers per capita has doubled over the last four
decades in this country, as in many others. Depending on whom one
counts as a provider of legal services, however, we actually only have
somewhere between ten and thirty percent of the world total - a
share that is perfectly understandable given our proportion of the
world's economic activity. 3
In any event, most of this country's lawyers are not engaged in
litigation. The bulk of lawyers perform nonadversarial tasks such as
drafting wills and contracts, conveying real estate, and incorporating
and advising businesses. Even considering lawyers' adversarial work,
a high proportion involves helping people who have problems with
the government - whether in their taxes, their social security or
2. The Vice President was putting out for popular consumption the REPORT FROM
COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS (a Council chaired by Quayle),
AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA (Aug., 1991) [hereinafter AGENDA].
3. See Marc Galanter, The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, WIS. INST. OF LEGAL
STUD. (1992) (25 to 30 percent), and Ray August, The Mythical Kingdom of Lawyers,
78 A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1992) (as of 1987, 9.4%), for different estimates of the United
States' share of the world's laywers. See Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalisatlon
[sic] Around the North Atlantic, 55 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1992), and Dean Robert Clark,
Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad? 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 275 (1992), for
thoughtful explorations of the causes and effects of the world-wide upsurge in the numbers and uses of lawyers.
THE PRESIDENT'S
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welfare benefits, or, most commonly, when facing criminal charges.
The real target of popular lawyer-bashing is the civil litigator. What
makes litigation distasteful to so many people is that while lawyers
in this setting are trying to do something helpful for their clients,
they are also doing something harmful - financially, reputationally,
and emotionally - to the targets of lawsuits. Furthermore, because
approximately twenty million suits are filed every year in federal and
state courts, this seems to bear out the widespread concern about
American litigiousness and the felt need for tort reform.
When one looks closely at the composition of this civil suit
caseload, though, it turns out that only a small fraction - about five
percent of the total - are tort suits.' The vast bulk of lawsuits involve family, property, and contract disputes. Businesses and governments are far more likely to sue individuals for repayment of debts
than they are to be sued themselves for infliction of tortious injuries.
Even within the tort caseload, most claims filed and monies expended arise out of motor vehicle accidents in which many of the
smaller claims are filed by victims themselves, without the help of
lawyers. A generous estimate of the total insurance costs of tort liability is $130 billion,5 of which roughly $90 billion goes for motor
vehicle coverage.' Only a minor share of the money is expended for
the product and medical litigation that attracts most of the popular
and political attention. Medical malpractice insurance and litigation
expenses, for example, cost $9 billion a year, or only
about one per7
cent of the nation's $840 billion health care bill.
4. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System - And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992), for an indepth treatment of the scope and trends in tort (and other) litigation.
5. Recently estimated in TILLINGHAST, TORT COST TRENDS: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 3 (1992), and including both premiums paid and self insurance costs.
6. We arrive at this estimate by extrapolating from A.M. BEST Co., BEST AGGREGATES & AVERAGES - PROPERTY/CASUALTY 148-50 (1992), which calculated that of a
total of $83.3 billion for liability insurance premiums in 1991, $61.8 billion was spent on
auto liability premiums.
7. Of course, the direct costs of malpractice litigation and insurance do not include
the medical costs of "defensive" medicine induced by the prospect of litigation. Roger A.
Reynolds et al., The Cost of Medical ProfessionalLiability, 257 J.A.M.A. 2776 (1987),
estimate that these indirect costs of additional medical treatment are approximately
three times the cost of malpractice premiums. This is the figure, when applied to the
earlier $80 billion estimate of tort insurance costs, that led Dan Quayle (relying on a
suggestion by Peter Huber) to put the total tort bill at $300 billion. See AGENDA, supra
note 2. This amount could be as high as $400 billion now, given the recent Tillinghast
estimate of $130 billion in direct costs.
Such an extrapolation from the malpractice context is fallacious for several reasons.
First, nearly three-fourths of direct tort costs come from motor vehicle litigation, which

One reason medical and product litigation tend to be the focus of
legislatures is that successful suits in these settings tend to win far
higher damage awards than in the motor vehicle field. Equally important is the fact that the subjects of products and malpractice liability are well-organized constituencies of doctors and businesses
that are ready and able to take on the trial lawyers in the legislative
arena. Furthermore, the parties seeking cutbacks in tort litigation do
not highlight the scholarly evidence that, relative to the number of
potential "high stakes" tort claims, only a minority of suits are actually filed. 8
Appreciating the true state of affairs - that in some respects we
have a gap, rather than a surplus, of tort suits - does not imply
complacent endorsement of the status quo of the tort system. These
facts testify, in part, to a serious shortcoming in the present system:
tort law is mainly accessible to victims of motor vehicle injuries in
which the negligence of another insured party is reasonably easy to
document. On the other hand, if there were more malpractice or
products liability suits, for example, we would not necessarily be better off. That judgment requires a further policy inquiry about
whether litigation does more good than harm when the suit is actually initiated. That question cannot be answered generally. In the
Study we answered the question in various ways, field-by-field. For a
sophisticated and fair-minded appraisal of competing positions in the
tort debate, though, one must necessarily keep in mind the harms
inflicted on people who suffer personal injury as a result of tortious
behavior, in addition to the harms inflicted on enterprises that suffer

produces little if any indirect financial expenditures. Second, malpractice litigation takes
place within a health care system in which doctors make the vast bulk of treatment
decisions on behalf of patients whose extensive health care insurance leaves little need for
consumer resistance to unnecessary but expensive tests and procedures ordered by their
doctors. Manufacturers faced with product litigation do not have this market luxury
when they consider adopting defensive designs or production procedures. Finally, as the
authors of the JAMA study cited above recognize, defensive medicine (and by analogy,
defensive manufacture and defensive driving as well) can all save money to the extent
this involves useful precautions that avoid accidents. Reynolds et al., supra at 2778,
2781.
8. A recent RAND Study, DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND, COMPENSATION
FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 127, table 5.6 (1991), found that out

of 100 people who reported a serious injury for use of a consumer product, only 20
victims even thought of suing and just five consulted a lawyer; of those who saw a lawyer,
only three found one prepared to take their case. Two of the three filed suit and one
collected payment. Of course, most consumer product injuries are not tortious because of
the limited scope of liability for "defective" products. The Harvard Medical Practice
Study in New York, however, found that 1 in 25 hospitalized patients suffered an injury
from medical treatment, 1 in 4 of these due to provider negligence; but of the 1 in 100
patients who were the victims of an actual tort, only 1 of 7.5 filed a malpractice claim,
and only I in 15 collected any money. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE 137-40 (1993).
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financial injury as a result of tort litigation. 9
III. Too HIGH PREMIUMS AND AWARDS?
The fact that the tort coin has two sides is little consolation to the
obstetricians, day care operators, and small plane manufacturers, for
example, who are all preoccupied with their experience of huge premium increases that have occurred at various times in the past. An
additional concern of theirs is that this phenomenon will recur in the
future. Even though claims and litigation rates are not statistically
excessive, defendants and their lawyers assume that juries are prone
to dip into the "deep pockets" of the enterprise in order to award
outlandish sums of money to badly-injured plaintiffs.
Supporters of the tort system - a curious alliance of personal injury lawyers and consumer activists - counter that the tort system
is an indispensable weapon against the "outrageous misconduct"' 0 of
corporate enterprises that are only too ready to place private profit
over public safety. Among the parade of horribles advanced in support of this cause are asbestos, DES, the Ford Pinto, the Dalkon
Shield, and - the most recent contender - silicone breast implants.
Tort advocates insist that juries of ordinary people should be able to
register society's moral condemnation of such corporate behavior by
rendering awards in amounts that send a message to not only this
defendant, but to other companies as well not to tread that same
path again.
At the same time, though, many argue that the true source of
sharp premium increases - or worse, denial of any insurance coverage at all - is not to be found in the outcomes of tort litigation.
Instead, the source is found in excess profit-making by a noncompetitive insurance industry using the excuse of popular unrest about lawyers and civil juries as a cover for hiking premiums far above
liability costs. Ironically, the remedy prescribed (and undertaken)
9. For example, the Harvard Medical Practice Study found that the cost to New
York State's health care system of just the additional medical treatment required for
patients who were injured as a result of their initial hospitalization was larger than the
total malpractice premiums paid. Note that New York is a state that has malpractice
litigation levels as high as anywhere in the country. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 8, at
95-97.
10. This is the title of a journalistic account of the asbestos tragedy, PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT (1985). For a recent retelling of the same story in the
same vein by a plaintiff's lawyer arguing against an administrative replacement for asbestos litigation, see Ronald L. Motley & Susan Nial, A CriticalAnalysis of the Brickman Administrative Proposal. Who Declared War on Asbestos Victims' Rights?, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 1919 (1992).

for this supposed market failure in insurance is yet more litigation
- this time an antitrust suit that, if successful, will produce treble
damage awards."'
Our own view about the insurance side of the tort system is that
much of what happens to premiums and coverage in the short run
cannot be directly explained by trends in litigation. In the longer
run, though, insurance prices do reflect those legal trends.12 A distinctively cyclical flavor marks the flow of capital in and out of the
insurance industry which, in turn, accounts for the steep increases in
premiums in different lines of liability coverage at different points in
time during the last three decades. One may safely assume that the
same cyclical pattern will recur in the 1990s, generating yet another
crisis atmosphere in the debate about tort law.
On the other hand, in general, liability insurance is one of the
more competitive industries in our economy. The purchasers of coverage are either reasonably sophisticated business consumers or doctors who often have coverage provided by their own "bedpan
mutuals." Thus, doctors, for example, have recently seen their liability insurance premiums go down as well as up, a luxury not yet experienced by patients in their health insurance premiums.
Interestingly, retrospective investigations over a longer time span
have shown that trends in rising tort claims, especially those claims
that grant average-sized awards, do account for the
magnitude of
13
premium increases over the entire insurance cycle.
Some features operating within the tort system, however, appear
to aggravate the problem of unaffordable (or unavailable) insurance
coverage. In particular, contemporary tort law has generated considerably greater unpredictability about the nature and extent of liability visited on enterprises. Hence, uncertainty is created about the
premium amounts an insurer must charge now for claims that may
not be payable for a long time in the future.
A key source of such uncertainty in high-stakes litigation is the
amount of liability that will flow from open-ended jury determination of damage awards, especially under such inherently subjective
categories as pain and suffering and (typically noninsurable) punitive
damages. Medical malpractice, for example, has experienced only
modest tinkering with the initial liability requirement that a doctor
11. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989),
rev'd, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991). For a critique of the argument of the plaintiffs in
this case, see Paul L. Joskow & Linda McLaughlin, McCarran-FergusonAct Reform:
More Competition or More Regulation?, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 373 (1991).
12. See generally, Kenneth S. Abraham, The Once and Future Crisis, 4 J. RIsK &
UNCERTAINTY 353 (1991).
13. See, e.g., David J. Nye et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis:
An Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEo. L.J. 1495
(1988).
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fall below the medical profession's own standard of care. Nonetheless, we now regularly see multi-million dollar awards once physician
fault has been found by the jury. While judges do wield some afterthe-fact authority to prod the parties to reduce such initial awards,
this process takes place only within parameters set by an original
jury verdict, which may be far out of line. More systematic scholarly
examination 4 has demonstrated huge variations in average awards
across different counties governed by the same state law. The
amounts that are awarded against one type of defendant, rather than
another, also show great variation. For example, malpractice awards
are three times the size of motor vehicle awards after controlling for
the age of the victim and the severity of injury. Ex ante, the prospect
of a runaway tort award - even worse, of a multiplicity of such
awards stemming from a single decision about a product design or
plant location - can generate a level of risk aversion among potential defendants and their insurers that is far more costly and economically disruptive than the same tort expenditures made in a more
rational and predictable fashion.
Equally important in evaluating both the size of individual awards
and trends in average awards is a skeptical consideration of what is
known as the "morality play" - depicted in both courts and legislative chambers - of a contest between an innocent victim and an
unscrupulous defendant. Even when the source of the immediate
product disaster was deliberate profiteering, rather than unfortunate
(albeit negligent) human error, the executives actually guilty of such
misdeeds do not personally pay the awards. Moreover, the culpable
executives have often left the business long before the consequences
of their misdeeds come to light. The reality of all high-stakes litigation - even medical malpractice, in which the nominal defendant is
usually an individual doctor - is that some corporate enterprise or
other entity will actually pay the award with money that is then deducted from taxable income. The ultimate burden of both jury
awards and legal costs, then, is shifted to the shareholders, employees, and customers of the company or the industry, even though none
14. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and the "Crisis" in
Civil Justice, 11 JUsT. Sys. J. 32 (1986); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James
F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Painand Suffering," 83 NW.
U. L. REV. 908 (1989) [hereinafter Valuing Life and Limb in Tort]; Randall R.
Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other Personal Injuries Created Equal?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991); Brian Ostrom et al., What are Tort
Awards Really Like? The Untold Story from the State Courts, 14 LAW & POL'Y 77
(1992).

of these groups had any personal culpability for the victim's injury.1 5
The specific distribution of the tort burden among these several constituencies of the enterprise or the broader community depends on a
complex interplay of consumer, labor, capital, and tax markets in
that sector of the economy.

IV. RESHAPING TORT DAMAGES
This pragmatic conception of tort liability as a vehicle for injury
prevention and compensation, rather than moralistic condemnation,
has equally important implications for reform of tort damages - of
the standards determining what kinds of harms will be compensated
and by how much.
At a minimum, we need to introduce a meaningful degree of law
into this area to provide lay juries with greater judicial guidance and
supervision as they make judgments about appropriate monetary
figures in individual cases. This does not imply that occasionally outlandish jury awards have caused too much money to be spent on tort
damages overall. Indeed, scholarly research documents that more seriously injured victims tend to recover only a part of their total financial losses, notwithstanding the supposed legal entitlement to full
compensation for both economic and noneconomic losses."' That is
why we strongly oppose the politically popular tool of caps on damages, regardless of whether the cap is on the total award or just pain
and suffering. Such a legal measure is highly regressive because capping awards imposes the burden of containing liability costs and premiums upon the most severely disabled, the people who are most
likely to be undercompensated even without a damage cap. Instead,
our objective is to ensure that the necessary amounts of tort damages
are more carefully channeled to those victims most deserving of compensation in light of rational insurance principles. Under those principles, the prime focus of tort damages should be the actual financial
losses suffered by personal injury victims, in amounts that are more
predictable and insurable by enterprises.
A.

CollateralSources

From that premise flowed several major prescriptions for tort reform. The first is that collateral source payments should be offset
15. The article written for this Symposium by Professor Alfred F. Conard, Who

Pays in the End for Injury Compensation? Reflections on Wealth Transfersfrom the
Innocent, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 283 (1993), is an especially valuable elaboration of this

often forgotten truth about the ultimate incidence of tort liability.
16. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 8; ELIZABETH M. KING & JAMES P. SMITH,
ECONOMIC LOSS AND COMPENSATION IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS (1988); and Frank A.

Sloan & Stephen S. van Wert, Cost and Compensation of Injuries in Medical Malpractice, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (1991).
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against the tort award, instead of being ignored in damage calculations, as now. In other words, liability insurance should be a second
payor to loss insurance (medical or disability), which is much
cheaper and faster to deliver. Tort liability should then be a second
payor to systems of no-fault liability, such as workers' compensation.
Implementation of this new collateral source rule requires that the
lien or subrogation rights of loss insurers be repealed at the same
time.1 7 A further practical problem is how to handle collateral benefits that may be paid to the plaintiff after the award is fixed. The
amount of collateral benefits paid in the past is identifiable through
ordinary methods of proof. In the case of long-term losses, however,
the amount of collateral benefits payable in the future is likely to be
speculative. For example, the capacity of the plaintiff to secure private health insurance in the future is uncertain, and the scope of any
new or improved social insurance programs that could add to the
plaintiff's benefits is unknown.
One possible solution to this dilemma would be to offset against
the plaintiff's award only those future benefits of which the plaintiff
is legally assured at the time of trial - i.e., benefits payable in the
future under existing insurance contracts and social insurance programs."" An alternative would be to employ a test that is vaguer in
form, but in most cases would be similar in result: offsetting not only
benefits of which the plaintiff is legally assured, but all future benefits that the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence,
will be payable in the future. Admittedly, in certain instances this
kind of inquiry would be speculative. The key is to fashion a method
17. Which in turn may well require federal legislation to remove the preemptive
effect of Medicare and Medicaid (see Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) and Rubin v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. 840 (D. Haw. 1989)), and ERISA (see FMC
Corp. v. Holiday, 490 U.S. 52 (1990)) on such state efforts to rationalize tort damages.
18. For example, under New York law, evidence regarding proposed offsets to the
plaintiff's damage award is admissible to show that any past or future expenditures by
the plaintiff were or will "with reasonable certainty, be replaced or indemnified, in whole
or in part, from any collateral source" (with certain exceptions). N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. &
R. § 4545(a) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1993). The requirement for reasonable certainty
regarding future expenses can be met only if the plaintiff is legally entitled to receive the
collateral benefits as a result of an enforceable agreement or contract. Id. Michigan law
requires a finding that the benefit derives from a collateral source obligated either by
contract or statute to pay. MicH. CoMp. LAWS. ANN. § 600.6303(5) (West 1987 &
Supp. 1992). In Ohio, offsets are limited to collateral benefits the plaintiff has received or
may receive within five years from the date of judgment. Orno REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.45 (Anderson 1991). And the collateral source rule in Florida has been construed
to bar offsets for future collateral source payments dependent on future employment.
Measom v. Rainbow Connection Preschool, Inc. 568 So. 2d 123 (5th Cir. 1990) (construing FLA. STA. ANN. § 768.76 (West Supp. 1993)).

that provides a reasonable blend of precision and ease of application
in offsetting future collateral benefits against tort recoveries, so that
tort damages only compensate actual financial losses and are not
used to provide duplicate recovery.
B. Future Losses and Periodic Payments
The need to refine the treatment of future collateral source payments has made us consider the even more speculative endeavor of
estimating the future losses against which such collateral payments
would be offset. Juries are now asked to make a once-and-for-all calculation of the plaintiff's total economic losses, including those to be
suffered twenty or thirty years in the future. One slice of this problem emerged on the tort reform agenda in the mid-1970s. The result
is that legislation has been produced in a number of states authorizing or mandating periodic payment of tort awards or settlements
over the life of the victim.19 In our Study, we endorsed this periodic
payment idea, but only if it were made reciprocal. In other words,
contrary to the standard "reform" model (exhibited in California
malpractice law), if a periodic award for the victim's losses will
cease when the victim dies earlier than anticipated, then the award
must be extended when the victim lives longer than expected.
Even that more equitable version of periodic (or structured) payments addresses only a single future contingency - a deviation of
the victim's actual from his actuarial life. Juries still must decide
what kind of health care costs, for example, will be required to care
for the plaintiff a decade or two later. Juries, though, do a poor job
in making this estimate and often underestimate compensation. One
likely reason for systematic undercompensation of the most severely
injured plaintiffs is a psychological tendency of jurors to underestimate the total dollar cost of a loss factor - again, health care costs
whose actual burden will rise exponentially with soaring inflation. 20 We are inclined to favor the view, then, that any comprehensive reform of tort damages that takes seriously the desire to
compensate actual financial losses of victims should at least experiment with a procedure whereby the jury determines the victim's
losses (net of collateral sources) and damage amounts for the current
year(s) and then specifies what trajectory these losses are likely to
take in selected future years. The court, with advice from the parties, would then establish the formula that ensures compensation of
such future losses at appropriate rates of inflation, whether paid
19. The best treatment of this topic is Roger C. Henderson, Designing a Responsible PeriodicPayment System for Tort Awards: Arizona Enacts a Prototype, 32 ARIZ. L.
Rzv. 21 (1990).
20. See Saks, supra note 4, at 1216-21, 1268-69.
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through a lump sum award or paid on a periodic basis.
C. Pain and Suffering
The legal treatment of pain and suffering accounts for nearly half
the damages paid in high-stakes product or medical litigation.
Rather than ad hoc, open-ended jury determination under the common law, or crude nominal dollar caps imposed by numerous state
legislatures, we propose an inflation-adjusted monetary scale for such
awards - under which the largest sums of money will go to younger
victims who suffer severe injuries, and who then will have funds to
purchase substitute forms of enjoyment of life while afflicted with
their disability.
The major practical challenge to implementation of this proposal
is the task of preparing the recovery scale. Part of this task is empirical. Decision-makers can be greatly assisted by knowledge of the
actual awards that juries within the jurisdiction have made for different classes of injury. Because in many jurisdictions the number of
recent awards in different categories may be too small to be statistically reliable, a national study would be useful as a reference point. 2
Another feature of the task is normative, not empirical. Decisionmakers will have to determine the appropriate methods of categorizing injuries, and then set the presumptive upper and lower bounds
on awards in each category.2 2 Because both these features of the normative task require policy judgments, legislatures could set the
scales themselves. We believe, though, that a more fruitful approach
would be legislative establishment of a special commission to recommend recovery scales to the supreme court of each state. The courts
would be given the authority to adopt the scales, with or without
modification. These special commissions could be composed of practicing lawyers, health care professionals including rehabilitation
therapists, and citizen members. In this way, the technical, judicial,
and political features of the task of constructing recovery scales for
21. The team of Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein has already done pioneering work
in this regard. See Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort, supra note 14, and
James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing
Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1991).
22. In their analyses, Bovbjerg, Sloan, & Blumstein suggest use of a matrix that
would award damages based on factors including the victim's injury severity and age.
See Blumstein et al., supra note 21, at 190-94; see also Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and
Limb in Tort, supra note 14, at 938-53. Alternatively, a limited number of typical injury
"scenarios" and their accompanying dollar values could be presented to the jury as
guides for their damage determinations. See id. at 953-56.

noneconomic loss would be allowed to operate, subject to mutual influence and constraint. This process would preserve legislative oversight, but because there would be no direct legislative
involvement in fixing recovery scales - the possibility of deadlock
and pure political compromise would be minimized.
D. Attorney Fees
A crucial corollary to this new approach to damage awards 23 is its
treatment of the plaintiff's attorney fees. Actual participants in the
tort litigation/liability insurance system have long understood the de
facto role played by both the traditional collateral source rule, which
duplicated recovery for certain financial losses, and the arguably excessive amounts awarded for pain and suffering. The combination of
the two served to provide successful plaintiffs with the wherewithal
to pay for the time and expense of their attorneys. That phenomenon

is what makes so inequitable the standard approach of tort reformers
who simply cut back on these alleged excess damage categories. The
actual consequence of such "reforms" is to leave many plaintiffs who
have meritorious claims and severe injuries with a net deficit in compensation for their financial losses, after the plaintiffs attorney has
deducted a contingent fee that usually runs from thirty to forty percent of the award against the defendant.
Our solution to that problem 24 is not to maintain the erratic and
unpredictable status quo, but rather to create a new category of
23. We should note that punitive damages present an analogous problem to pain
and suffering damages in terms of the inherent subjectivity of such jury verdicts. Indeed,
punitive awards are not only unpredictable in amount, but often random in occurrence.
For that reason we devoted chapter 9 of our Study, "Punitive Damages," to developing a
set of principled criteria for whether and how much punitive damages should be assessed
in tort cases. Victor Schwartz and Mark A. Behrens sketch the nature of and rationale
for our proposals, which they largely endorse. Victor Schwartz & Mark Behrens, The
American Law Institute's Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal
Injury: A Timely Call for Punitive Damages Reform, 30 SAN Dieco L. REv. 263
(1993).
We add this parenthetical comment about the debate. Rather than deal with punitive
damages concerns on their intrinsic merits, representatives of the plaintiffs' bar have
sought to dismiss this problem as quantitatively unimportant. They rely on recent empirical research (synopsized at 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 233-35). This research indicates that punitive awards are an exceptional rather than a typical event in personal
injury suits against product manufacturers and health care providers. Other researchers
have reached similar conclusions. See Michael Rustad, Demystifying Punitive Damages
in Product Liability Cases, 78 IowA L. REv. (forthcoming 1993). While in aggregate
terms punitive awards are a much less substantial problem than pain and suffering
awards, this is hardly an argument against otherwise justifiable reforms of this component of the tort system. If in fact defects exist in the design of this litigation product, this
is a good reason for carefully rethinking the standards we are now using, rather than
dismissing the problem on the grounds that only a few randomly selected defendants are
unlucky enough to suffer severe legal injuries from the current design.
24. Developed in chapter 10, "Attorney Fees," 2 ALI STUDY, supra note I, at
267-317.
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compensable tort damages - the successful plaintiff's attorney fee.
Our basic rationale is quite simple. When someone is hurt as the
result of a defective product or negligent doctor, the victim must pay
for medical treatment of the resulting injuries - a mode of professional assistance that tort law fully compensates now. The victim,
however, must also pay for legal treatment of her injuries with the
help of another professional, a lawyer - to be able to collect tort
damages that help pay for the needed medical care. Our position is
that tort damage awards should be expanded to compensate successful plaintiffs for this tangible financial cost of the defendant's original tortious behavior.
Implementation of this proposal raises some problems of design; in
particular, determining what is the appropriate level of compensable
attorney fees. Clearly, the judgment about what fees the defendants
must compensate will have to be made by and for the tort system,
rather than simply left to private contract between plaintiffs and
their attorneys. In our view, the best approach is to use the contingent percentage formula that is now the norm in personal injury litigation. This model avoids the additional controversy that has been
experienced in civil rights litigation about the appropriate number of
hours of legal time spent on a particular case, and the proper hourly
fee for that time. The model also maintains the current incentives
faced by plaintiffs' attorneys to refuse or drop cases that appear
nonmeritorious.25
The crucial judgment about the correct percentage remains. Probably the figure should vary depending on the nature of the injury
setting (e.g., aviation versus environmental) and the time of case disposition (e.g., before discovery or during trial). We found in debates
about our Study that nothing raised the hackles of plaintiffs' lawyers
more than the thought that legislatures or courts would have to scrutinize the reasonableness of their existing fee percentages. We did
not propose that the tort damages formula would dictate the terms
of the actual fee arrangement between plaintiff and client (i.e., the
client could contract to pay more or less than the standard percentage included in the award). This typical lawyer reaction to our proposal, however, suggests that external legal guideposts for the
contingent fee system might well be a good idea in its own right.
The reaction from the other side - defendants and their attorneys
25. For a theoretical defense of the contingent fee on this score, see James D.
Dana & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric
Information in Attorney Compensation (1992) (unpublished).

is that the proposal constitutes inequitable one-way fee-shifting.
In other words, if a patient sues her doctor and wins recovery, the
patient's attorney fees are to be paid by the doctor: is it not fair,
then, that if the doctor wins, the patient should pay her legal bills?
Indeed, former Vice President Quayle and the President's Council on
Competitiveness 21 made "loser pays" the centerpiece of the Republican program of tort reform to reduce "excessive" litigation in this
country.
As between the typical personal injury victim and tort defendant,
however, only an illusory equality to two-way fee-shifting exists. The
true reason the doctor should pay the successful plaintiff's legal expenses is that the doctor has been found guilty of medical malpractice that inflicted serious physical injury on the patient. In contrast,
the mere fact that a patient has sued a doctor and lost does not
imply that the patient (or his lawyer) was guilty of legal negligence
(any more than the fact that a doctor loses a patient on the operating table implies that the doctor was guilty of negligence). Additionally, the doctor's liability insurer, and not the individual doctor,
would pay the plaintiff's legal costs (along with the rest of the tort
award). By contrast, few, if any, patients would be insured against
the sizable cost of losing a lawsuit. Two-way "loser pays" is a recipe,
then, for sharply reducing the incidence of tort claims in the medical, product, and environmental areas where, as noted earlier, empirical investigation has documented that only a portion of potentially
meritorious claims are now being brought.
Thus, from the point of view of tort and personal injury policy,
two-way fee-shifting is an unwarranted step. From the point of view
of improving the administration of civil litigation, a possible case for
this idea exists, at least if varied to make a plaintiff's lawyer pay
defendant's legal fees when a suit is lost. Personal injury lawyers
would be able to insure against this legal risk and incorporate the
premiums (or self-funded reserves) for such coverage into their cost
structure and fee formulas (as doctors now do for medical malpractice insurance). The resulting formula would, in turn, determine the
size of the fee award won by successful plaintiffs and paid to their
attorneys. The typical losing defendant would, therefore, end up paying the legal costs of the typical successful plaintiff, and the losing
defendant, in turn, would pass this cost on to the blend of shareholders, employees, customers, and taxpayers mentioned earlier. Assuming standardized fee formulas and experience-rated (or self)
insurance for plaintiffs' lawyers, this new litigation liability system

-

26.

AGENDA, supra note 2, at 8-9, 19 & 24-25.
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might enhance the current incentives faced by personal injury lawyers to weed out good cases from bad, and drop or settle the latter.2"
For the moment, though, we agree with the views of those 28 who
suggest that experimentation with this version of no-fault liability for
legal injury should begin with contract litigation between businesses
that operate on a comparatively equal legal and economic plane.
V.

REFINING PRODUCTS LIABILITY

We turn now to the legal standards used to determine when personal injury victims are entitled to any tort damages. A full chapter2" has been devoted in our Study to a number of doctrinal issues
that have preoccupied judges and scholars in the products liability
field over the last two decades. Our principal conclusions were that
the standard for defective design and warning should be fault-based
in light of the state of the art at the time of production and marketing. Judgments about whether a design was defective should not turn
on consumer expectations as such, but on a balancing of risks and
benefits from alternative designs that would satisfy the consumer's
expected use of the product. With respect to warnings, it is crucial to
avoid the too-ready finding that a particular warning might have
been helpful after the fact without regard to the danger of information overload before the fact (i.e., manufacturers trying to incorporate every conceivable warning that might be the subject of litigation
if something goes wrong).
The positions we took were largely in accord with those advanced
in mainstream tort scholarship.30 We were under no illusion that
these doctrinal refinements, however justified in their own right,
would make anywhere near the difference in actual product litigation
as do practical factors such as attorney fee arrangements, trial by
jury, and damage principles.31 Thus, we are bemused by the fact
27. For a mixed, though preliminary, verdict on this score, see Edward A. Snyder
& James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts
Theory, 6 J. L., ECON. & ORGANIZATION 345 (1990).
28. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System:
The Council on Competitiveness' Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 250
(Feb.-Mar. 1992).
29. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 33-82 (chapter 2, "Product Defects and
Warnings").
30. For example, Professors James Henderson, Jr. and Aaron Twerski, the new
Reporters for the ALI's project for a Restatement (Third) of Products Liability, advocated essentially the same positions in their subsequent article, A Proposed Revision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512 (1992).
31. The reasons why have been detailed by one of our ALI colleagues. See Gary
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that so much emphasis is placed on products liability law in this
Symposium - with much of Jerry Phillips' and all of Marshall
Shapo's contributions chastising us for presuming to tamper with
what they consider to be the fully-enlightened judicial product in
this area. 32 Because Professor Shapo, in particular, takes issue with
the historical underpinnings of the Study, it may be useful to begin
with a brief treatment of the development of modern products liability law - in order to indicate somewhat more precisely how that
process of development has influenced our approach to the subject.
Consider the California experience as reflected in the landmark
opinions from the formative era in products liability law. The modern view is generally traced to Justice Traynor's famous concurrence
in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 3 an opinion that reflects the mixed heritage of the products area. In a single highly suggestive passage, Traynor offers a consumer expectations rationale for
strict liability which sounds in warranty; an enterprise liability justification, grounded in both risk-spreading and accident prevention
considerations, sounding in tort; and a pragmatic basis for liability,
drawing upon the kindred spirit of res ipsa negligence law. Traynor
discusses none of the refinements among manufacturing defects, design failures, and inadequate product warnings that would become a
staple feature of later product liability analysis. Nor does one find
any of the reservations about the "strictness" of strict liability that
creep into later explications of products liability law, such as ours refinements and reservations that trigger the criticism of Professors
Phillips and Shapo, among others.
The question, though, is can, and should, such reservations and
refinements be avoided? At first the influential California Supreme
Court seemed to think so. The landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba
Products, Inc., 4 in which strict liability for defective products was
finally adopted, did consider and reject contract warranty as the legal base for personal injury claims. In his Greenman opinion, however, Justice Traynor drew no distinction between tort treatment of
manufacturing and design defects, and he made no reference to
warnings. Moreover, a few years later in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson

Schwartz, ProductsLiability and Medical Malpractice in Comparative Context, in THE
LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 28-80
(Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
32. Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Reporters' Study of Enterprise Responsibility for PersonalInjury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 241 (1993); Marshall S. Shapo, An
A.L.L Report Markets a Defective Product: Errors at Retail and Wholesale, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 221 (1993).
33. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). The majority decided the case on the
traditional negligence footing, using res ipsa loquitur to sustain the plaintiff's claim.
34. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
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Corp., 5 the court went out of its way to criticize and reject the position of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that a
product is defective only if the product is "unreasonably dangerous."
Strict liability was treated, instead, as self-defining: liability automatically ensued when the risks in the product came to fruition.
The court, though, soon found it necessary to move beyond the
simple and straightforward approach taken in these early cases. The
key opinion is Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 6 in which a
worker was injured by the capsizing of the high-lift loader he was
manipulating on hilly terrain. Barker can be viewed as a classic
"misuse" situation, exposing some of the inadequacies of the California court's earlier approach to the products area. In a Barker-type
case three alternative scenarios are possible: 1) the manufacturer can
be viewed as properly responsible for marketing a product with a
"defective" (excessively dangerous) design; 2) the employer can be
viewed as properly responsible for requiring the driver to use the
product in an excessively dangerous way; or 3) the employee can be
viewed as personally responsible for using the product in an excessively dangerous fashion. Whatever the case, the court could not
simply apply the Greenman-Cronin approach to the situation and
mechanically equate harm with manufacturer responsibility for a
"defect."
The court, in fact, established a two-pronged test. The consumer
expectations rationale was not rejected - indeed, it was the first
prong - but its limitations were exposed to view: could the court
possibly treat as dispositive the worker's "expectations" when he was
instructed to operate the loader on sharply sloping terrain? Clearly,
what constituted a "defective" design was not self-defining, nor necessarily a function of the driver's state of mind. A second prong risk/utility analysis, reflecting considerations not unlike the "unreasonably dangerous" standard in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts - was enunciated for cases where consumer expectations provided no guidance. The early attempt to move effortlessly from negligence to strict liability had clearly faltered, and the
ensuing decade, the 1980s, did little to effectuate a new synthesis in
California, or elsewhere.
What has emerged, in our view, from these early efforts to forge
35. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). Here, a device
meant to hold bread trays in place at the rear of a delivery truck failed to do so, injuring
the plaintiff. Id.
36. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).

an all-encompassing products liability standard is a recognition that
any useful framework for dealing with the product-related injury
cases must be sensitive to the variety of defective product claims. In
manufacturing defect cases where the claim is essentially that one
unit of the product has generated a risk not ordinarily associated
with the product line - the classic exploding soda bottle case establishing that the harm occurred from such a malfunction is sufficient. In this sense, liability for manufacturing defects is "true"
strict liability: no additional showing of unreasonableness is necessary to establish liability. While Professor Phillips is technically correct in observing that the category of manufacturing defects is not
air-tight - in some sense, a production process which allows for one
exploding soda bottle in every one million soda bottles produced
could be regarded as a failure in design - courts and commentators
have had no substantial difficulty identifying a particular product as
flawed when something went wrong in its operation as compared to
the performance of typical products in that line. Strict liability in
these cases, which we endorse, is a relatively straightforward rule to
administer and it comports with both the enterprise liability foundations of tort, mentioned earlier, and the consumer expectations underpinnings of warranty.
By contrast to the conceptual ease of manufacturing defect cases,
design defect claims require some limiting principle. As our brief
discussion of Barker indicated, product-related injury, in itself, is an
inadequate marker for assigning responsibility. Shortly after adoption of the crashworthiness doctrine, motor vehicle cases brought the
point home clearly. Was an automobile manufacturer to be strictly
liable for burns resulting from ruptured gas tanks even though any
conceivable alternative placement of the gas tank would have led to
greater dangers of the same sort? 37 Was the manufacturer of a recreational vehicle with the engine in the rear to be liable for all frontend collision injuries, despite distinctive consumer utility associated
with the design?38 These and other cases led to a search, one that
continues, for a satisfying limiting principle.
In our view, risk/utility analysis, coupled with a requirement that
a reasonably feasible, safer alternative design is available, is an appropriate test for design defect. Theoretically, risk/utility creates the
appropriate incentives for safe design. Conceptually, risk/utility
meshes well with the defenses of consumer fault, product misuse,
and alteration. Pragmatically, the requirement that a reasonably feasible alternative must exist focuses the risk/utility inquiry, making it
37. See Self v. General Motors, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974); see
generally Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1980).
38. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
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concrete to the jury, and avoids global speculation about whether a
product - for example, all-terrain vehicles or above-ground swimming pools - is "essential" or "inessential" in cases where a generic
product line is under attack.3 9
Our critics protest the elimination of consumer expectations as an
alternative basis for liability. In response, we would suggest that our
approach eliminates a test that suffers from a number of flaws. In
patent defect cases, a consumer expectations test may be used as a
broad defense against liability for harm caused by "open and obvious
risks" - a bar that many courts have considered excessively generous to the makers of dangerous products. By contrast, in latent defect cases the test may be easily used in a conclusory sense to avoid
inquiry into the optimal level of design safety to be expected from
product manufacturers. More specifically, the consumer's expectation in any particular case is, quite simply, that the product will not
cause harm. Moreover, when consumer expectations do arguably deserve some independent weight - consider, in this regard, Professor
Shapo's product promotion rationale for manufacturer liability 40
no reason exists why consumer expectations cannot be factored into
the "risk" term in a risk/utility test. For example, the actual risk of
a product is actually increased when product promotion creates justifiable expectations by consumers that the product is safe for use
without consumers having to take special precautions.
Like design defect cases, product warning claims raise singular issues that require distinctive consideration. Legitimate concerns can
be raised about both under and overdisclosure. Less than optimal
disclosure is inconsistent with the notion of promoting consumer
choice, which we take to be a fundamental principle. A requirement
of greater than optimal disclosure is also potentially inconsistent
with the idea of consumer sovereignty, because excessive warnings
may actually undercut the cautionary and informational functions
that warnings are meant to promote. Additionally, requiring greater
than optimal warnings is inconsistent with the goal of creating
proper safety incentives.
What, then, is the optimal level of warning? Most courts have
come to adopt a standard of reasonableness measured from the time
the product is marketed. 41 This is the approach that we have adopted
-

39.
scholarly
40.
41.

See O'Brien v. Muskin, 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983), which set off a firestorm of
criticism for encouraging such jury speculation.
See Shapo, supra note 32, at 227-29.
See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal.

because it best approximates the informational and deterrence functions just mentioned. While "true" strict liability - a time of trial
approach to information about risk, as espoused by Professor Phillips, among others - would further promote the compensation function of tort law, the furtherance would be at the expense of the other
goals just mentioned and, we would argue, at the expense of a basic
notion of fairness. This notion of fairness holds that one should only
be responsible for information about risk that one knew or should
have known about at the time the product was actually marketed.
We would further buttress the reasonableness standard in warning
cases by adding two other provisions. To begin with, if a safer way of
making the product exists at a reasonable cost under ordinary circumstances, a warning would not suffice. For example, an otherwise
adequate warning would fail in the case of a lawn mower with a
dangerous opening over the rotary blade that could inexpensively be
eliminated. The same would hold true for products posing dangers to
children that could be reduced or eliminated through childproof
caps. Secondly, in order to avoid haggling and unproductive speculation in cases of a sub-standard warning, the legal assumption should
be that the injured party would have heeded a proper warning avoiding a counterfactual inquiry into cause-in-fact.42
This provides only the briefest outline of the contours of our approach to the products area and our points of disagreement with our
critics. In assessing these suggestions, it is critical to keep in mind
what we said earlier, that the doctrinal side of products liability law
is not the most salient dimension of our proposals. For all of the
discussion and criticism that our products liability proposals have
generated, they do little more than draw on what we regard as the
best current thinking of courts and commentators addressing the
substantive issues of products liability law - an attempt, on our
part, to put the various pieces of the puzzle together in a coherent
fashion.
These proposals, however, would be seriously lacking in force
without our more innovative and far-reaching remedial strategies regarding damages, for example. Here is where we part company from
Professor O'Connell, who faults us for not thinking in sufficiently
bold terms. We do not deny that our pragmatic inclinations made us
look for workable, feasible reform initiatives. But we regard the doctrinal synthesis just sketched out, taken in tandem with our package
of damage reforms, as a rather substantial departure from present
tort law - and one that promises to reduce the unpredictability of
Rptr. 412 (1988); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
42. This is one point at which we disagree with Professors Henderson and Twerski.
See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 30, at 1522.
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liability and the unevenness of compensation now endemic to the
system.
VI.

PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS

Early in this article we observed that, contrary to popular and political opinion, comparatively few tort claims are actually pursued,

based on the total number of tortious injuries. Absent better mechanisms for identifying, compensating, and preventing avoidable injuries, such evidence of a litigation gap argues for reform measures

that would make it easier to sue and win legitimate claims. This is
especially true in the environmental arena. Nowhere else are the legal and practical hurdles to recovery so high as in the cases of victims of long latency diseases caused by diffuse environmental
hazards.43 While recognizing the legitimate concerns posed by mass
tort litigation," we proposed a major innovation in the legal nature
and proof of disease causation in these cases.45
Current law requires proof that it is more probable than not that a
particular toxic hazard caused a claimant's disease. If, and only if,
the answer is affirmative, the law awards full compensation for all
the consequences of the disease. We recommended, instead, that environmental causes of action be based on epidemiological findings of
the proportion of overall level of a disease attributable to such exposure, as long as the proportion was at least twenty percent. Under
our proposal, victims who have been exposed to an environmental
hazard would not have to prove that it was at least fifty-one percent
likely that, for example, their cancers resulted from the exposure.
Rather, if the likelihood were thirty percent (or sixty percent) they
would collect damages for only thirty percent (or sixty percent) of
their losses.
43. The evidence is summarized in chapter 11, "Environmental Injuries," 1 ALI
STUDY, supra note 1, at 301-34, and more recently by two of our ALI colleagues, Troyen
Brennan in his Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1993), and Donald N. Dewees, The Role of Tort Law in ControllingEnvironmental Pollution, 18 CAN. PUB. POL.
425 (1992). The one conspicuous exception to this observation about environmental liability is asbestos - a discrete substance to which millions of workers were exposed in
generally confined quarters, and which generated 100,000 tort claims once scientific investigation had established a very high correlation between asbestos exposure and certain

kinds of diseases.
44. See 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 441-83 (chapter 14, "Administrative Compensation Schemes"); Peter S. Menell, The Limitations of Legal Institutions For Addressing Environmental Risks, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1991).
45. See 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 319-82 (chapter 11, "Scientific and Legal
Causation," and chapter 12, "Standards of Environmental Liability").

This new doctrine of proportional liability could substantially expand the liability of certain enterprises, most notably chemical manufacturers. Indeed, our environmental liability proposal generated
strong opposition from a number of members of the defense bar,
equal in intensity to the distaste of the plaintiffs' bar for our damages proposals described above. The pincer movement of these two
significant components of the American Law Institute's membership
led the ALI Council to decide to terminate the project with our
Study, rather than put our recommendations out for debate and vote
by the Institute's membership.
As a matter of abstract principle, the defense bar's objection to
our proposal is weak, because under ideal conditions proportional liability would charge enterprises for precisely the amount of injury
they actually cause - no more, no less. This sum would simply be
divided proportionally among all who might have been injured by
such companies, rather than be paid in larger amounts to those
plaintiffs who could surmount the fifty-one percent hurdle. We acknowledge, however, that numerous defendants would shoulder more
liability than they do at present: those whose activities actually cause
considerable levels of environmental injury, but injuries sufficiently
diffuse in impact that few victims can prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that their diseases were actually caused by any particular defendant and its hazardous sources. Expansion of liability in
such situations is precisely the point of our proposed reform.
Admittedly, practical problems exist in administering proportional
liability fairly. These problems have been the principal target of critics of the idea. One problem is how to assure the reliability of evidence regarding the probability that the defendant's actions caused a
plaintiff harm. The Study recommended procedures by which courts
could draw on nonpartisan scientific expertise. The important issue
here, however, is not only which experts should make the probability
determination, but what standard should be used to make this determination. In our view, the typical preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard is not a sufficiently exacting basis for making proportional
liability awards. Rather, in order to be sufficient, such evidence (ordinarily based on epidemiological studies) ought to have widespread
support in the scientific community. With this standard in mind, the
Study recommended formation of "blue ribbon" science panels to
provide courts with assistance in making judgments regarding scientific issues. Crucial to this alternative is that courts have a sufficient
basis for concluding that the epidemiological or statistical evidence
of causal probability presented to them is respectable and reliable.
The second obstacle to fair administration of proportional liability
arises in a case in which the plaintiff established that the defendant's
actions more probably than not were the cause of his injuries. Under
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traditional rules, the plaintiff would be entitled to an award of full
damages in such a case. In contrast, our Study recommended that in
all cases in which proportional liability is appropriate, plaintiffs
should receive only a proportion of damages, even if the evidence
shows that the defendant's actions were more probably than not the
cause of the plaintiffs injury. The Study recommended that proportional liability begin at the point when evidence shows at least a
twenty percent probability of causation, and that damages be proportional to causation up to the point when the probability is at least
an eighty percent probability that the defendant's action caused the
injury in question.4 6
The critical issue, then, is how to determine which of the claims
that would traditionally warrant full recovery would, nonetheless, be
subject to proportional liability and would, therefore, entitle the
plaintiff to only a limited, proportional recovery. On this point the
Study was unambiguous, but evidently more elliptical than would
have been necessary to reassure its critics. Clarifying our position
may be useful: in any case relying on epidemiological proof of causation, proportional liability recovery rules, not traditional all-or-nothing liability rules, would apply. Some defendants, then, would pay
damages in cases in which they would have entirely escaped liability
under traditional rules, and other defendants would pay only partial
damages in certain cases in which they would have been held liable
for full damages under traditional rules.
VII.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE

A major premise of our proposed recasting of tort damages was
clear-eyed recognition of the fact that the tort bill is not ultimately
paid by the guilty actor, but instead is distributed among the several
constituencies of the enterprises that are sued. An additional implication of that point of view was our proposal for a new model of
"organizational" liability for medical injuries in place of the apparently-personalized liability presently imposed on the individual doctor judged negligent. 7 Under our proposal, individual hospitals (or
46. In that respect our proposal differed from that of the REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS
114-20 (1990) (the study recommended proportioning recovery only for cases in which
the probability of causation lay between 20 and 50%, and paying full damages in all
cases that satisfied the "preponderance" (more than 50%) criterion).
47. For initial development of this idea, see chapter 4, "Medical Malpractice," 2

other health care organizations, such as HMOs) would bear exclusive liability for any malpractice-related injuries inflicted on the hospital's patients by doctors (or other health care providers), whether
or not the doctors were employees of the organization. The only exception would be for injuries resulting from intentional (as distinguished from merely negligent) misconduct. As a consequence,
individual physicians would, for all practical purposes, be completely
relieved of legal liability for patients admitted to a hospital. Indeed,
we envisage that hospitals and doctors would likely find it sensible to
have the former's liability insurance cover all patients treated by its
affiliated physicians, irrespective of whether the patient ever used the
hospital.4
We believe that this new liability regime would provide several
positive advantages within our pragmatic conception of the role of
tort law. More stable insurance would be available to both medical
providers and injured patients because hospital-based coverage
would be large enough to handle individual catastrophic cases, but
less susceptible to the dislocating swings of the insurance premium
cycle. Our litigation system would also operate more economically,
because of reduction in the number of, and legal jockeying among,
potential defendants (e.g., family physician, surgeon, anesthetist, and
hospital). Most importantly, tort law would exert a more effective
preventive influence against future medical injuries because the focus
of liability would be at the level of the institution whose memory,
planning, and decision-making is most susceptible to legal/financial
incentives.
Several practical obstacles would have to be overcome, however,
before organizational liability for medical malpractice could be effectively implemented. Two such obstacles deserve special attention:
the method by which the regime would be brought into being, and
the insurance adjustments that would have to be made during the
transition.

ALI

STUDY, supra note
TRIAL 122-32 (1991). At

1, at 111-26; PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON
the present time, two of us are embarked on a project to work
out the details and address the pitfalls of enterprise responsibility for medical injury. See
Kenneth S. Abraham and Paul C. Weiler, Organizational Liability for Medical Malpractice: An Alternative to Individual Health Care Liability for Hospital-Related Malpractice (1993) (unpublished).
48. Doctors with admitting privileges at several hospitals would simply designate a
primary hospital affiliation for this specific insurance purpose.
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A.

Elective or Mandatory Participation

Organizational liability might take one of two different forms elective or mandatory. The elective version could be implemented either through purely voluntary contracts between hospitals and doctors or other health care providers, or under the authority of an
enabling statute. Under the pure contractual approach, hospitals and
doctors could voluntarily agree that hospitals would indemnify doctors against liability for medical malpractice. In contrast, an enabling statute could authorize, but not require, hospitals to undertake
organizational liability. Such an undertaking would automatically
relieve affiliated physicians of liability for medical malpractice ensuing from doctors injuring hospital patients.
Under either elective approach, doctors would receive an immediate windfall and hospitals would suffer an almost immediate loss.
Until health insurance reimbursement rates (and malpractice insurance premiums) adjusted to the new liabilities, therefore, payments
would be required from doctors to hospitals to reflect these windfalls
and losses. Eventually, as we suggest below, health insurance adjustments should make such payments unnecessary.
A second approach would be mandatory organizational liability,
under which all hospitals would automatically bear liability for medical malpractice claims against their affiliated physicians, who would
correspondingly be made immune from suit. With little direct experience in organizational liability, however, moving hastily to a
mandatory system would likely be a mistake. Much is to be learned
and rmany wrinkles ironed out before a single model is required of
everyone. Consequently, we recommend a series of demonstration
projects using the elective approach - preferably involving several
hospitals in a single geographic region - as a prelude to legislative
adoption of across-the-board organizational liability.
B.

Complementary Insurance Adjustments

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to implementation of organizational
liability is the need for considerable adjustment in background insurance arrangements. First, malpractice liability insurance premiums
charged to hospitals and doctors would have to be altered.4 9 Second,
49. If full organizational liability were adopted for both hospital-patient and non-

hospital-patient events, then physicians would no longer have to purchase malpractice
insurance at all, because they would be totally immune from suit. In turn, the malpractice premiums or payments to self-insured reserves of hospitals would have to increase,
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adjustments in allocation of the costs of care by doctors and hospitals, and in reimbursement schedules of private and public health
care insurers, would be required because the fees that doctors and
hospitals charge their patients are based, in part, on their respective
costs of malpractice insurance.
It is vital to assure that both kinds of adjustments are made. The
financial health of both hospitals and doctors depends too heavily on
reimbursement schedules to permit a purely wait-and-see approach
to the adjustment of these schedules. Detailed and coordinated planning by malpractice and health insurers is necessary so that the transition to organizational liability can be made smoothly, equitably,
and without severe economic dislocation. A useful mechanism for
dealing with this transitional problem, especially if organizational liability were elective, would be payment of surcharges by doctors to
the hospitals in which they enjoyed admitting privileges. The payments would be roughly equal in amount to what the doctors were
saving in malpractice insurance as a result of this protection from
suit. As noted earlier, two of us are now engaged in a study that will
outline precisely how these adjustments should be made.
Such a shift in the focus of medical liability from the individuals
providing medical care to the institutions under whose auspices the
care is provided reflects our broader rejection of the moralistic conception of tort law - as an instrument for imposing on the people at
fault the burden of the harms they inflict on innocent victims. What
malpractice law really does is serve as a point of entry to a judicially-mandated system of disability insurance under which liability
insurers pay successful tort claimants with funds ultimately accumulated from premiums paid by potential patients for health insurance.
Channelling the relative burden of such liability in a way that accentuates the injury prevention incentives felt by parties in a position to
avoid tortious harms is crucial. For this reason, we advocate imposing medical liability on health care organizations, rather than on individual providers.

because hospitals would bear liability for all malpractice claims made on account of care
provided by affiliated health care providers. On the other hand, if as a first step hospitals
were to bear liability only for injuries suffered by their own patients, then health care
providers would continue to purchase malpractice insurance, but such insurance would
need to cover only liability for non-hospital-patient care. Even in this case substantial
downward adjustment of individual premiums would be required, with a concomitant
upward adjustment of premiums (or payments to self-insured reserves) by hospitals.
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VIII.
A.

BEYOND TORT LAW

Good Fences Make Good Neighbors

The foregoing gives some of the flavor of our approach to reform
of the tort system. A number of serious scholarly critics of tort litigation are impatient with what they characterize as our tinkering
with an irreparably flawed regime.5 0 Certain of these critics believe
we would be better off with no tort law at all. In their view, the
positive functions of injury compensation and prevention now performed by cumbersome and expensive litigation would best be parcelled out among such alternative institutions as private competitive
markets (for consumer products), first party loss insurance (for medical treatment and lost earnings), and administrative regulation of
health and safety risks (from food and drugs or the workplace).51
From the outset of our Study, we sought, as they have, to avoid a
narrow tortcentric cast to our analysis. We undertook a comparative
evaluation of the contributions that could be made by all of tort's
institutional neighbors in the broader personal injury universe. That
effort brought clearly home to us that civil litigation was by no
means the only policy instrument through which our society fixes responsibility for personal injury. Even granting the sizable gap, noted
earlier, between the number of injuries that occur and the number of
tort payments that are made, most personal injuries5 2do secure some
redress from a variety of other community sources.
At the same time, notwithstanding our natural lawyers' preoccupation with the operations and failings of the tort system that we
know best, we must not lose sight of the characteristic flaws of these
other programs. Scholars who study Social Security Disability Insurance, for example, or the Occupational Health and Safety Act, or
50. That is particularly true of our colleague Jeffrey O'Connell, as exhibited by the
title and tenor of his article that he coauthored with Chad M. Oldfather for this Symposium: A Lost Opportunity: A Review of the American Law Institute's Reporters' Study
on Enterprise Responsibilityfor Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 307 (1993).
51. For example, while largely endorsing our proposals for reforming the existing
tort system, Stephen D. Sugarman believes that we would be better off replacing tort
litigation with these alternatives: see his review of our Study, A Restatement of Torts, 44
STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1992).
52. For a comprehensive review of the scope of public and private insurance, see
Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance,and Tort
Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensationfor Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 75 (1993). This article estimates that in 1990, when tort payments totalled roughly
$50 billion, health insurance coverage expended $385 billion ($200 billion public and
$185 billion private) and long term disability insurance $41 billion (just $6 billion private, the rest under Social Security).

the private market for medical services, are fully conversant with the
characteristic flaws of these institutions.5" Only a minority of longterm lost earnings are insured against. The command and control
regulation of workplace hazards imposes substantial costs upon employers with only a modest reduction'of injury to workers. Additionally, for good reasons, we think, the American polity is not prepared
to leave to purely private contract the questions of how medical
treatment is to be provided to patients and who will be the provider.
Even with that more realistic appraisal of the limits, as well as the
scope, of nontort institutions, we are aware of intriguing speculations
about whether the nation would be better off dispensing with tort
litigation entirely, leaving the injury field to these alternative regimes. Perhaps because of our more pragmatic bent - taking the
world as it is, not as some of us might dream it should be - we did
not propose such a political nonstarter. Our Study accepts the continuing reality and value of tort law - a system of civil liability,
primarily shaped by judges and juries, enforced by victims themselves against enterprises responsible for their injury - as an instrument that should, and will, remain available for other kinds of injury
problems not adequately dealt with in either the private marketplace
or the political and regulatory arenas.
We recognize that in many specific settings tort law is not needed,
and that superimposing a lawsuit on top of another public or private
remedy may do far more harm to defendants than good to plaintiffs.
For that reason, we proposed a variety of reform measures designed
to erect better demarcation lines

-

better fences

-

between tort

and its neighbors.
1. CollateralSource Offset.
Earlier we developed the case for this reform of tort damages. Although our social insurance safety net still has far too many holes in
it, that system is available to many personal injury victims at much
lower costs in terms of money and time.54 Tort liability insurance
should be a second payor, then, to public or private loss insurance.
2. Regulatory Compliance Defense.
The reach and effectiveness of legal regulation of unsafe workplaces, motor vehicles, consumer products, and even food and drugs
is inherently limited. These administrative programs, however, do
address a number of the most important injury risks regarding safety
53. See, for example, Clayton P. E. Gillette & James Krier, Risk, Courts, and
Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027 (1990), for a comprehensive review of the inadequacies of institutional alternatives to tort litigation in dealing with toxic risk.
54. See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 52.
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standards devised by specialized agencies. Many people are troubled
that current law allows a jury to ignore such experienced administrative judgment and substitute lay views about the appropriate steps
for a firm to take in reducing the inevitable risks generated by its
enterprise (e.g., selling medical appliances). Thus, we fashioned a
carefully-limited regulatory compliance defense 55 that could be made
available to private actors who have informed the responsible agency
of what they knew or should have known about a hazard and have
relied on the standard of conduct propounded by the agency for
them.
3. Product Warnings.
Inevitable imperfections exist in the degrees of information, appraisal, and choice available to individuals presented with the array
of goods and services in the marketplace. Hence, we think that allowing product manufacturers or health care providers, for example,
to insist on full waiver of liability for anyone wanting to avail themselves of what is being offered would be a mistake. We, therefore,
developed a number of measures 56 that would better enlist the services of tort law -

in particular, product warnings law -

in elevat-

ing the level of consumer awareness of risks and the ways to avoid
them.
B. Elective No-Fault Medical Liability
Closer to tort's home is the alternative legal model of administrative no-fault liability. This regime is designed to provide more accessible and more economical compensation to all the injured victims of
a particular activity, irrespective of whether the injury happened to
be due to someone else's identifiable fault. At the same time, nofault liability fixes financial responsibility on the enterprise whose
activities gave rise to the injury. The principal exemplar of this liability model is workers' compensation. Though workers' compensation has recently been afflicted with many of the same ailments as
55. See 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 83-110 (chapter 3, "Regulatory Compliance") for both the scope and, equally important, the limits we propose for such a tort
defense. At a minimum, when a regulatory compliance meets these criteria, then the
award of punitive damages should be precluded and a rebuttable presumption should be
created showing that the defendant has satisfied the tort standard of liability.
56. See 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 33-82 (chapter 2, "Product Defects and
Warnings").

tort law -

rising levels of litigation and premiums5

7 -

one point

that both business and labor agree upon is that they do not want to
repeal the workers' compensation system and revert to tort liability.
Workers' compensation spends a far higher proportion of its compensation dollars on victims than on lawyers, and the system has proven
considerably more influential 5in
reducing occupational injuries than
8
has administrative regulation.
For these reasons, we believe in trying the no-fault model elsewhere - in particular, in health care. 9 Hospitals or health care organizations should eventually be made responsible for the patient's
otherwise uncompensated financial losses from all seriously disabling
medical injuries, irrespective of the presence or absence of provider
fault.60 We are fully aware of the doubts concerning both the costs
of such an expansion of liability and of the difficulties in making
judgments about whether a current patient disability is really due to
medical treatment, rather than from the original illness requiring the
treatment. 6 ' That is why we recommend a pilot plan of elective nofault liability for medical injury. Such a plan would permit observation of the pros and cons of this liability approach in actual operation (and can be compared to malpractice litigation). This pilot
phase should consist of the following components:
1. Express legislative authorization would be given to hospitals
and other health care organizations to offer their patients the option
of an administrative system of no-fault compensation for all medical
injury occurring within the hospital, in return for waiver of the right
to sue the hospital and any other health care providers for malpractice associated with the injury in question.
2. After being informed in an understandable manner of the tort
rights to be surrendered and the no-fault rights to be provided, patients would choose between treatment in a no-fault hospital and a
tort-fault hospital.
57. Total workers' compensation premiums soared from $25 billion in 1984 to over
$60 billion in 1991. See John F. Burton, Jr., Workers' Compensation Costs in 1991, 5
WORKERS' COMPENSATION MOMTOR 1 (May-June, 1992).
58. See MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. Kip VISCUSI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR
JOB RISKS: WAGES, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY (1990) (Viscusi
was one of our colleagues on the ALI Project).
59. We also carefully reviewed the virtues and limits of the no-fault alternative for
mass toxic harms. See 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 441-83 (chapter 14, "Administrative Compensation Schemes"), that is elaborated upon in Robert L. Rabin, Some
Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52
MD. L. REv. (forthcoming 1993).
60. See 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 487-516 (chapter 15, "Elective No-Fault
Medical Liability"); WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL, supra note 47, at 132158; Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REv. (forthcoming 1993).
61. The Harvard Medical Practice Study did provide considerable information on
both these scores: see WEILER ET AL., supra note 8.
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3. Compensation would be sufficiently generous to replace the vast
majority of the economic losses of patients who are disabled for a
minimum period - e.g., at least two months. Such compensation
would include full medical and rehabilitation expenses not covered
by other sources of insurance, a fairly high percentage of wage loss
(e.g., eighty percent) up to a multiple of the state's average wage
(e.g., up to twice that level), again offset by payments from other
sources such as disability insurance, and specified payments for lost
household production and long-term loss of enjoyment of life.
4. The program would include a claims administration procedure
that would be neutral, fair, and easily accessible to patients. A board
of independent arbiters would resolve disputes over coverage and
amount, and devise "designated compensable event"6 2formulas to reduce the incidence and difficulties of such disputes.
5. Hospitals would be authorized to impose a surcharge on physicians and other health care providers with admitting privileges in
exchange for relief from the threat of tort liability. These reductions
and surcharges would have to be supported by actuarial data approved by the state Insurance Commissioner or other designated official who reviews ordinary malpractice premium levels.
6. The hospital or health care facility offering no-fault benefits
would have in place an effective quality assurance program and
would receive state-provided authority to surcharge or suspend the
admitting privileges of accident-prone physicians, together with protection from antitrust liability for doing so.
Pilot no-fault programs with these components would provide the
basis for determining whether full scale mandatory systems should
be adopted. Additionally, data gathered as part of any pilot project
could help liability insurers adjust their malpractice premiums and
enable health insurers to adjust their reimbursement rates in the
event that full-scale no-fault programs were adopted. Today's comparatively uncontroversial malpractice climate provides the right
conditions for pilot studies to be completed before the next malpractice "crisis" 3 makes dispassionate, long-term investigation of this reform option much more difficult.

62. See Lawrence R. Tancredi & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Rethinking Responsibility
for Patient Injury: Accelerated CompensationEvents, A Malpractice and Quality Reform Ripe for a Test, 54 LAW & PROBS. 147 (Spring 1991).
63. See Walter Wadlington, A Medical Malpractice Crisis in 1995?: Some Conceivable Scenarios, 36 ST.Louis U. L.J. 897 (1992).

CONCLUSION

The responses to our Study reflect the range of interests at stake
in the ongoing debate about personal injury law and compensation in
this country. No proposal for substantial reform can be made without receiving criticism from those with a substantial interest in
maintaining the status quo or from academic critics who find life
without a tort system they are familiar with difficult to imagine. Yet,
no sooner is a proposal made for altering a doctrinal component of
tort law while retaining certain of its other features, than the proposal is criticized as insufficiently bold "tinkering" with tort law.
Because our Study contained proposals of both kinds, it is not surprising that it received both kinds of criticism. We recommended
some substantial tort reforms and did not hesitate to consider farreaching substitutions of non-tort approaches to compensation and
safety regulation in place of the current system of tort law. Because
we saw major flaws in the tort system from the standpoint of both
victims and injurers, we were bold in considering reform. But, recommending major changes simply for the sake of being bold is pointless. When the defects of a radical approach to reform seemed to us
to be greater than the benefits derived from such an approach, or
when adoption of a recommendation (e.g., universal disability insurance) seemed utterly unrealistic, we declined to endorse that particular approach and instead proposed sensible and feasible changes.
Nonetheless, some of the reforms we recommended were sufficiently
controversial that the leadership of the American Law Institute
could not bring itself fully to confront them. If an organization like
the Institute could be paralyzed by internal divisions about such issues, one cannot help wondering whether even more substantial reforms - whether they would expand or contract tort liability
have any chance of adoption in the current climate.
This kind of institutional gridlock may well be broken in the foreseeable future. In the interim, though, our Study might well serve as
a model and as a resource for those who believe that improvement of
our liability and compensation systems depends on dispassionate and
rigorous analysis of the strengths and wealmesses of all possible
methods of dealing with personal injury prevention and compensation. This Symposium itself has made a genuine contribution to that
process of improvement.
-

